Insufficient Domestic Demand in China: An Exaggerated Story  by Shaofeng, Chen
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  253 – 270 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Forum
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.03.085 
Selected Papers of Beijing Forum 2010 
Insufficient Domestic Demand in China: An Exaggerated 
Story 
Chen Shaofeng 
Assistant Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University 
Abstract: 
In both the academic world and the policy circles, insufficient domestic demands in China are widely believed to 
aggravate global economic imbalance and set back China's efforts for a sustained economic growth. Such a notion, 
however, has been exaggerated, so has the role of China in aggravating global economic imbalance. Moreover, 
contending China's under consumption is not only misleading but also detrimental to China's sustainable development. 
Misleading it is since it is based on flawed statistical methods and there are some missing pies. It is detrimental in the 
sense that the whole discussions are centered on a goal of economic growth, without paying due respect to the nature. 
Untempered expansion of China's domestic consumption comparable with the US would not necessarily bode well 
for China and the world. More important is to transform the undergoing mode of production and consumption and 
better balance the relationship among human beings, natural resources and the ecology. 
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1. Introduction  
Ranging from academic, business and policy-making circles there goes a story which says that China's 
domestic demand or consumption is insufficient. The grounds are based on the fact that private 
consumption-to-GDP ratio in China is much lower than that of world average as well as of many countries 
in the world.  
China was hence put the blame on for global economic imbalance. i  Even Premier Wen Jiabao 
delivered such a warning message that “overinvestment and lack of domestic demand are producing an 
economic bubble” in China during the National People's Congress.ii
In spite that China's under consumption (޵䴰н䏣) has gained currency across the world, such a 
notion, however, is problematic as it is based on data which were collected in flawed statistical methods 
and have not covered the whole story in the case of China. This paper aims to analyze why such a 
judgment has been exaggerated. It is necessary to do so since it can help us better comprehend China's 
economic imbalance and where it really pinches China. This paper argues that viewing China's 
consumption as inadequate is not only misleading but also detrimental to China's sustainable development. 
Misleading it is since it is based on flawed statistical methods and there are some missing pies. It is 
  
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Forum
254   Chen Shaofeng /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  253 – 270 
detrimental in the sense that the whole discussions are centered on a goal of economic growth, entirely 
ignoring the required resources and ecological consequences to buttress a consumption-driven society.  
The following section will first analyze why the statistical methods used to calculate China's domestic 
consumption has some flaws. Section three will discuss some missing parts that have not been 
incorporated into China's domestic consumption. Following that, the fourth section argues that resource 
inputs need to be re-priced given China's substantial subsidies within its large exported products. At last, a 
normative analysis will be proffered to buttress the view that a growth-centered and domestic 
consumption-driven society cannot go far.  
2. Flawed statistical methods  
Underlying the view of “under consumption” in China are two related but distinct concepts: domestic 
versus international dimensions. The domestic dimension is about the underperformance of household 
consumption relative to the rest of the economy: over the past decade or so, fixed investment growth and 
exports have outpaced the growth of China's household consumption, and hence consumption as a 
percentage of GDP is low. As shown in Figure 1, final consumption expenditure in China contributed to 
its GDP growth declined from 62.3 percent in 2000 to 46.6 percent in 2008. 
Figure 1 Contribution Share of the Three Componens of GDP to Growth of GDP 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
The international dimension posits the contribution of the Chinese economy to the global economy 
derives more from its role as a producer than as a consumer. Specifically, in the US economy personal 
consumption contributes US $10 trillion due to “over-consumption”, whereas Chinese personal 
consumption only created US $ 1.6 trillion due to its “underconsumption”.iii In the past decades, the final 
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consumption expenditure-to-GDP ratio in China was much lower than other countries like the US, Brazil, 
India, and so forth (see Figure 2). It fell far behind the world average of 70 percent and the ratio of 
developed countries at 75 percent.iv
According to McKinsey Global Institute, the private domestic consumption-to- GDP ratio in the US hit 
67 percent in 2008 while that in India and Brazil reached57 percent and 65 percent respectively. In 
contrast, the ratio in China was merely 37 percent, much lower than many developed countries as well as 
developing countries (See Table 1). 
 The low percentage was believed to have not only aggravated global 
economic imbalance, but also set back China's efforts for a sustained economic growth. 
Figure 2 Consumption Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 private domestic consumption as share of GDP in 2008  
country   % 
US   67 
South Africa  68 
UK  67 
Brazil   65 
France  58 
India  57 
Japan   55 
Germany   54 
Thailand     54 
Malaysia   52 
South Korea     48 
Singapore     40 
China   37 
 Source: Global Insight: McKinsey Global Institute analysis  
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There is a substantial body of research focusing on the causes of a low domestic consumption-to-GDP 
ratio in China. Some ascribed to the monopoly by the state- owned enterprises,v while others argued that it 
results from the growing income gap between regions and different groups of people;vi still others deem it 
an outcome of the duality system on city and countryside.vii
There are some flaws with regard to the statistical methods in which the Chinese official statistical 
system calculates economic data in China. Take self- owned residential house expenditures, the largest 
expenditure item for millions of Chinese families as an example, a method of so-called “imputed rent”( tui 
duan zu jin, ᧘ᯝ』䠁 ) has been adopted in the Chinese official statistical system to calculate the value of 
those self-owned residential houses. Under the national accounts system, the consumption expenditures 
for purchasing self-owned houses during the current period shall not be accounted for as expenses of the 
period. Rather, these expenditures will be incorporated into the statistical system by estimating the 
“imputed rent”, namely, a reference rent for a self-owned house by taking account of the annual rent of a 
house similar in quality, size, location, and many other aspects with the self-owned one. Hence, the 
expenditures for purchasing self-owned houses by Chinese citizens are treated as implicit expenses. 
However, due to undeveloped real estate tenancy market, the lack of relevant information has made it very 
difficult to glean the appropriate data on rent. Instead, the yearly expenditures for self-owned houses by 
Chinese citizens are virtually based on cost calculation, which is an aggregate of maintenance expense, 
depreciation cost, and management fee during the current period. These costs are far below the actual 
expenses for buying a house. As a result, it is inevitable that the yearly expenditures for self-owned 
houses by Chinese citizens have been underestimated. “The fact that the house-ownership ratio in China is 
over 80 percent suggests that the potential under estimation in this regard could be quite substantial.”
 All these analyses are premised that there 
exists an insufficient domestic consumption in China, but we want to challenge such a notion. The 
following will first discuss the statistical methods in which the insufficient demand thesis builds on.  
viii
Likewise, such flaws in statistics also exist in other fields like fundamental education and healthcare. 
Due to the huge population, China has been plagued by the bottleneck of supply demand imbalance in 
both public goods, that is, supplies of relevant services of high quality are quite limited, which can hardly 
cater to the demands of the Chinese public. This kind of imbalance has left room for the development of 
private schools and medical organizations. The Chinese people have thus been confronted with two 
different types of prices, one of which is a state- controlled price, and the other one is the black or grey 
market price.
  
ix
More salient a problem lies in data collection. The work is done by people who lost their jobs before 
and are not statisticians. They approached companies for information on revenues, profits, number of 
employees, and so on, but the problem is that many companies are reluctant to reveal their true situation 
for sake of averting taxes, outright bribery by local officials or other reasons. Rather, these companies 
would appear poorer than what they are. For instance, real estate sellers “often underreport how much 
they sell their homes for by 5 percent to 10 percent, to reduce their taxes and get the rest paid in cash on 
the side or in overseas accounts.” By the same token, while some local government officials have the 
incentives to inflate their GDP numbers, other officials may underreport their performance so as to get 
more funding from their superior governments, but in general, government officials often deflate their 
expenditure numbers.
 Normally there is a big gap between the two types of prices. Such a gap, however, has not 
been incorporated into the official statistics. 
x As Baston observes, China's statistical system “tends to be better at counting the 
output of state enterprises than tracking the consumption decisions of 1.3 billion people.”xi
According to Wang Qing & Steven Zhang, economists of Morgan Stanley, the Chinese official 
statistics has underestimated the percentage of consumption in GDP as well as the contribution of service 
industry to the overall GDP, but overestimated the share of investment. They believe that “China's 
insufficient consumption” is associated with the underestimated consumption of services. Two important 
sources of underestimation of service consumption in China are the consumptions of housing and personal 
 That is also 
why the Chinese statistical authorities often have to revise their previous figures to reflect the results of 
their latest economic census. 
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spending on healthcare. Drawing upon a like-for-like comparison ,they examined personal consumption of 
the non-services , tradable goods sector as well as specific categories of goods and services consumed by 
households in China and the United States, such as cars, beer and milk-drink product. They found that the 
gap between the two countries is much smaller than suggested by the headline aggregate consumption 
data, or the official data substantially underestimate the scale of China's personal consumption relative to 
that of the US.xii Using data on the Chinese economy and evidence from other countries' experiences, Guo 
and N'Diaye find that there is nothing “special” about consumption in China.xiii
3. Missing Pies  
 
Other than statistical flaws resulting in an underestimation of domestic consumption, there are also 
some missing pies that have not been included in China's domestic consumption.  
3.1. expenses in foreign countries by Chinese students studying abroad  
One of the missing pies is the growing consumption in foreign countries by Chinese citizens or those 
making profits from China. One way is to pay tuition fees and living expenses by many Chinese youths 
when schooling abroad. According to World Data on Education 2006 / 2007 by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), China sees the largest number of its people 
studying abroad. As of 2004, 2.5 million students were enrolled in educational institutions outside of their 
country of origin, among which the number of students from China accounted for 14 percent, that is, one 
out of every seven foreign students in the world is from China mainland. In 2007, the number of students 
enrolled in foreign educational institutions surpassed 2.8 million, and China sent the greatest number of 
students abroad, or specifically 421,148, with a share of 15 percent. China has also become the largest 
source of foreign students enrolled in many countries like US, Japan, Australia, UK and Germany. In 
2007 outbound mobile students from China reached 98958 in the US, 80231 in Japan, 50418 in Australia, 
49594 in UK, and 23791 in Germany. By contrast, there were only 42138 students from abroad studying 
in China in 2007.xiv
According to a statistics by the Ministry of Education of China, as of end 2008, the number of students 
of China citizenship studying abroad or having such experience came up to 1.39 million. Among them 
less than 130, 000 studied abroad during 1872-1978 and 340,000 in total by 2000. With over one million 
outbound mobile students from China, this number rose dramatically during 2000-2008. It is projected 
that the total number of Chinese students studying abroad will surpass two million in the next three 
years.
  
xv In 2009 alone, this number came up to 229,000, a growth rate of 27.5 percent over the previous 
year. Among them, 12,000 were dispatched by the Chinese government, whereas the left, namely 210, 
000 Chinese students went to study abroad at their own expenses, accounting for 91. 6 percent of 
outbound mobile students from China and this was a 30 percent increase over 2008.xvi
Since different schools in different countries require different tuitions, it is hard to infer the exact 
expenditures spent by those overseas Chinese students. For instance, according to the College Board of 
the USA, annual tuition costs and student budgets in public institutions range between $6,500-17,452 and 
$14,054 -29,193 respectively, while private institutions require $25,143 tuitions and $37,390 budgets ( see 
Table 2 ). One Chinese newspaper estimated that the capital outflows for education reach 30 billion yuan 
(about $4.52 billion, $1 = 6.64RMB) every year, based on a number of 300,000 outbound students from 
China and each spends 100,000 yuan ($15,060) for tuition fee; these capital outflows will be much larger 
when their living expenses in foreign countries, application fees, test fees (such as SAT /ACT, GRE, 
TOEFL, IELTS), visa application fees, agency service fee etc. are taken into account.
  
xvii
Although such data on the exact expenditures by those Chinese students studying abroad at their own 
expenses are unavailable, the following statistical data may shed a light. According to a survey conducted 
in 2010 by MyCOS, a private firm specializing in collection of education data and education consultation 
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and assessment, among the college graduates in China who go to study abroad, majority of them (86% ) 
have to rely on their families to afford their studies abroad (see Figure 3).  
Table2 Average Annual Tuition Costs and Student Budgets for the 2008-2009 Academic Year 
For the 2008-2009 academic year, The College Board reported the following average 
annual tuition costs by type of institution:  
z Two- year , Public Community Colleges: $ 6,500 
z Four- year , Public Institutions (out- of- state students ): $ 17,452 
z  Four- year , Private Institutions: $ 25,143   
These costs represent the cost of studies alone; when lodging, personal expenses, 
transportation, and other expenses are taken into account, The College Board suggests 
the following annual student budgets:  
z Two- year , Public Community Colleges (commuter students): $ 14,054 
z Four- year , Public Institutions (state residents; on-campus ): $ 18,326 
z Four- year , Public Institutions (out- of- state students ;on-campus ): $ 29,193 
z Four- year , Private Institutions (on- campus ): $ 37,390   
Note: Two-year colleges data from the American Association of Community Colleges, 2008.  
Source: The College Board, Trends in College Pricing, 2008. 
 
Figure 3 Major Financial Sources for Outbound Mobile College Students from China  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: MyCOS, 2010 nian Zhongguo Daxuesheng Jiuye Baogao (Jiuye Lanpishu) [Chinese College Students Employment 
Report ( Employment Bluebook )], http://www. mycos.com.cn /NewsShow /select.action; jsessionid 
=27244AC0689D664A15F1ED7B473FB3FB? entry =29475  
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There is another trend worth noting, that is, the number of outbound mobile students from China tends 
to be larger and their ages tend to be younger. According to data issued by the Ministry of Education of 
China, 840,000 high school students gave up their plan of attending China's College Entrance 
Examination and chose to study abroad in 2009. The number of such a group of students is growing at a 
pace of 20 percent annually. It is projected that this number might exceed one million in 2010.xviii 
In fact, many Chinese families send their kids to high schools or even fundamental schools in foreign 
countries in recent years. Students studying abroad at an age of below 30 account for 60 percent in the 
total.
The 
ages of outbound mobile students from China also tend to be younger.  
xix According to Yu Minhong, head of New Oriental (ᯠьᯩ), a famous organization specializing in 
language training and going abroad services in China, there are more young people going abroad for 
studies after their high school. In fact, high school students approximate one third of those studying in 
foreign countries.xx
The Open Doors Report 2009 issued by the US embassy in China shows that China is the premier 
source of international student intakes for American public and private institutions, and foreign students 
have contributed $ 18 billion to the US. Tuitions paid by foreign students accounted for 10 percent in the 
incomes of British universities in the 2008 -2009 academic year, a rise from 5 percent in the 1990s.
 Majority of this group of younger students have to rely on their families in China for 
the relevant costs. 
xxi
3.2.  migrants from China 
  
Another way is to directly spend abroad by Chinese citizens. The economic rise of China goes hand in 
hand with an increasing income gap between different regions as well as groups of people. While there are 
millions of very poor people struggling in making a living, a large body of affluent people can lavish their 
fortunes. Thanks to China's fast-growing economy, its population of millionaires is now the fourth largest 
in the world, moving past Britain in 2008, according to the2009 Merrill Lynch-Cap Gemini World Wealth 
Report. With more openness of the Chinese society, this group of new rich has brought several changes to 
China. First, more and more affluent Chinese have migrated to other countries and regions such as Canada, 
US, Australia, Singapore, HK, and so on. A so-called third wave of emigration has been under way in 
China. Different from the previous two waves, the major forces of the third wave are the new-rich class 
and elites of high skills. There are basically types of migrants. One is business migrants and the other is 
skill migrants. As shown in Table 3, for business migration, different countries and regions require 
different minimum investment. For instance, the US has set a $ 0. 5 million minimum requirement while 
Hong Kong has raised its threshold from 6.5 million HKD to 10 million HKD and excluded real estate as 
an investment. 
Table3 Minimum Investment Required for Business Migration and No. of Migrants from China in 2009  
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country   In local currency In Chinese Yuan 
 
No. of migrants from 
China in 2009 
United States 0.5 million USD 3.42 million 65,000 
Canada    0.4 Canadian dollar 2.35 million 25,000 
Australia  0.8 Australian dollar   4.54 million   16,000 (in 2008) 
Singapore   1.5 million Singaporean dollar   9.62 million   200,000-300,000 
(1990-2009) 
United Kingdom   1 million ponds   10. 6 million  
Hong Kong  6.5 m à10 million (from 14 
Oct. 2010, excluding real 
estate)  
5.6mà8.6million   3390 
 
Despite the high threshold, the number of Chinese emigrants continues ascending in the past few years. 
For example, according to Beijing Entry & Exit Service Association, the Chinese applicants for EB-5 visa 
of business migration to the US have doubled from 500 in 2008 to 1000 in 2009. Data provided by the 
State of Government of the US also show that during the fiscal year between October 2008 and September 
2009, the number of approved business migrants reached 4218 from1443 in the previous fiscal year, 
among which 70 percent came from China. Simply in light of the minimal investment requirement, the US 
has reaped 1.5 billion dollars merely from the entry of these business migrants from China in 2009. In the 
same year, HK and Canada acquired 52.87 billion yuan and 2.35 billion yuan from China Mainland 
business migrants respectively. It deserves noting that the above gains do not include the application fee, 
living expenses and their tremendous family assets from these business migrants. In fact, many countries 
such as Canada also require them to employ certain number of local people and generate certain quotas of 
sales and profits. Hence, overseas investment channels of migration have become a serious outflow of 
wealth in China today. 
The number of skill migrants is far larger than business ones. Their ratio comes near 20:1 in light of 
their application populations in the past ten years.
xxiii
xxii Compared with the corresponding loss of wealth for 
China, the loss of high-tech talents may be larger. Simply take Singapore as an example, this small island 
has accepted 200,000 -300,000 emigrants from China in the past two decades.  
3.3. travel and purchase abroad by Chinese citizens 
According to a report 
Global Politics and Security 2007 (ǉ 2007 ᒤޘ⨳᭯⋫оᆹޘǊ) published by China Academy of 
Social Sciences in 2010, with 35 million migrants, China has become the largest emigrant export country 
in the world.  
More Chinese can afford to travel abroad. As indicated in Figure 4, the number of Chinese outbound 
visitors has kept growing over the past two decades. By 2008 it is over 46 million, which is nine-fold 
growth over that figure in 1994. China's relative well-off amid the global financial tsunami would 
conceivably see a drastic rise of Chinese travelers in foreign countries in the coming years. There is no 
data available to tell us the expenditures the Chinese tourists have spent overseas, but due to hefty taxes 
and quality problems, savvy travelers always prefer to purchase branded products, electronics, cosmetics, 
clothes, tins of baby formula etc. from Hong Kong or other countries.xxiv
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Figure 4 Chinese Outbound Visitors (Unit:10,000 person-times) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook.  
Also, it is frequently reported that wealthy Chinese lavish in buying a bulk of famous brand products, 
particularly luxuries in foreign countries and regions. These luxuries, to name just a few, include 
limousines, watches, gold, jewelry, bags, clothes, high-grade foreign wines, carriable auctioned goods, 
and so on.
xxvii
xxv In contrast to a distressed luxury market in Europe and the US, the Chinese luxury market is 
growing better. At present, accounting for 25 percent of the global market, China's luxury consumption 
for the first time has overtaken the US to become the world's second-largest luxury goods consumer 
country after Japan.xxvi According to the China Association of Branding Strategy, the number of Chinese 
who can afford luxury brands is up to 170 million people, or 13 percent of the population in 2009, and this 
number will reach 250 million next year. Bain & Company predicted the Chinese luxury market would 
see a growth of 20 to 35percent in the next five years. The Ministry of Commerce says China will become 
the world's largest luxury market by 2014, accounting for 23 percent of global business.  
The Chinese new rich are more willing to buy luxuries in foreign markets because they feel that the 
quality of these products is more ensured and because these luxuries are cheaper due to lower taxes and 
duties than those in China, which often levies very high duties on luxuries and electronic goods. Take 
Burberry as an example, while expanding in China, it is touting for Chinese tourists in foreign markets as 
well. According to its chief executive, Angela Ahrendts, over 30 percent of the company's business in the 
UK today is to Chinese consumers. Hence, the company is trying hard to cater to the Chinese consumers 
in the top 10flagship markets in the world. In fact, Burberry goods were 40 percent cheaper in the UK 
than China, primarily because of taxes and duties, as well as the weakness of sterling in recent years.xxviii
 
 
Two salient large items that wealthy Chinese eye for are antiques / traditional works of art and overseas 
properties. According to BaoTime, a provider of news on luxuries and luxury market in the world, many 
millionaires from China are dedicating themselves to garnering antiques and works of arts out of their 
own preferences as well as the intention of maintaining long-term values of their tremendous assets. 
Properties in other countries and regions are another item that the Chinese new rich are keen on. It was 
reported that they have become a major buyer in HK, Australia, Singapore, US, UK and other countries. 
More and more Chinese rich flocked to these countries and regions. In London, buying up newly built 
properties in central London by Chinese rich came up to approximately 170million pounds ( $ 260 million) 
in the 12 month period ending March 2010.
 
xxix In 2007 Chinese buyers accounted for 7.5 percent of 
international buyers in the US, according to a survey by the National Association of Realtors. Although 
that number dropped to 5.4 percent in 2009, agents in California and Texas report a sharp increase in 
contacts from China in the same period. Other than the West Coast, the Chinese rich's interest in New 
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York is also growing stronger.xxx In some instances, they are so keen to buy that they often don't haggle 
and simply pay the price, which makes local estate agents dreaming to encounter clients from China.xxxi
The above numbers however are counted only on those investors based in China, but it could be much 
larger because “there likely are numerous other wealthy individuals who use their own money made in 
China to invest in the U. S. as well as others who invest money from investors located in China and who 
are operating beneath the radar.”xxxii
xxxiii
  
 One case typifies this. Drawing on the money from profits from his 
ventures in China, David Liu, paid roughly $ 480 million for about 8,000 units of rental-apartment 
buildings in California, and about $133 million in cash and assumed debt for seven Phoenix-area 
apartment complexes. While having made him one of the largest buyers in the U. S. in 2010, these deals, 
however, are not counted as foreign investment because he purchased these properties in the name of his 
company, Standard Portfolios, which is based in California. Now Mr. Liu is still looking to make similar 
acquisitions, particularly in the western U. S.  
3.4. underground economy 
Out of different considerations, some of them invest to 
take advantage of price drop or relaxed foreign investor laws in foreign states, while others purchase to 
evade domestic taxes, to gain education for their children, or to change their lifestyle. Many are looking 
for opportunities in the thousands of distressed properties on the market resulting from the economic 
downturn.  
Another missing pie that has not been counted in China's domestic consumption consists in the 
growing underground economy, which is an economic component unregistered to the government and 
unrestrained by government laws and regulations, thereby evading government taxes. Under-ground 
economic activities are associated with every segment of economic chain ranging from production, 
circulation, distribution to consumption. Its specific forms include bribery and corruption, gambling, 
pornography, smuggling, drug trafficking, embezzlement of state assets, illegal pyramid selling, money 
laundering, and so forth.  
Using four different models, Xu and Wang found the scale of underground economy in China is quite 
large despite a big variation under the four models. For example, as indicated in Table 4, in 2006 the 
highest value reached 509.7 billion yuan (roughly $ 78.4 billion) while the lowest one was also 311.8 
billion yuan (roughly $ 48 billion). Estimations by several Chinese scholars show that the average 
percentage of underground economy in China's GDP approximates 10 percent whereas in some years such 
as during the 1989-1993 periods the average climbed up to 20 percent; after 1994, the scale of 
underground economy in China tends to decline, but its share in GDP is still five percent or so.xxxiv Shaun 
Rein even believes that China's underground economy is far bigger than the 10 percent to 20percent of the 
total economy that most economists estimate.xxxv
Leaving the controversy about the exact magnitude alone, it is an undeniable fact that the scale of 
China's underground economy is quite astounding. In fact, “the smuggling of electronic gadgets like 
handsets, tablet computers and game consoles is so rampant that the ‘grey market’ for many of these 
devices already exceeds the amount sold through regular distribution channels.”xxxvi
  
 
 
Although part of the 
underground economy derives from the production and distribution process, the other part of it has been 
generated by Chinese consumptions, which, however, has not been counted into China's statistics.  
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Table 4 Estimation of China's Underground Economy with Four Different Methods (Unit: billion yuan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Xu Bing & Wang Yiping, ”Comparing the estimation methods on the scale of underground economy,” Statistics and 
Decision, No. 6, 2008, pp. 22-25. 
4. Re-pricing Resource Inputs  
There are many facets from which to look at China. First, it is an export- driven economy. As shown in 
Table 5, the share of China's exports of goods and services in its GDP reached 42.5 percent in 2007 from 
merely 23 percent in 2000.Despite a drop in 2008 due to the blow from the global financial crisis, its 
proportion is still much higher than the world average. Second, the country is well known as a world 
factory in that the secondary industry in general and manufacturing in particular contributes most to 
China's GDP. The share has increased from 45.9 percent to 48.6 percent during 2000-2008, in contrast to 
the world average at 29.2 percent in 2000 and 28 percent in 2008.xxxvii 
Combining both, it is easy to understand that manufacturing products are the primary components in 
China's exports. This is indeed so, as verified in Figure 5, which shows that primary goods and 
manufactured goods account for 5.4 percent and 94.6 percent in China's exports in 2008 respectively. 
Nevertheless, thanks to this export-driven GDP growth mode, China has to pay high prices in terms of 
resource input as well as environmental consequences. Its fast growth in the past three decades has largely 
been built on high inputs of factors of production, including labour forces, energy and other resources. 
Low prices of these high inputs have contributed to the competitiveness of made-in-China products, 
which helps push up China's exports to the outside world. 
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Table 5 Exports of Goods and Services as percentage of GDP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ķ Data refer to 2006.  
Source: World Bank WDI Database.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
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If cheaper labour forces are associated with China's current development stage and its huge populations, 
low prices of energy and other resources are largely because of state policy. Currently policy incoherence 
in China's energy pricing remains as pronounced as it has been for many years.xxxviii 
Although it is difficult to compare energy prices in different countries in view of differing royalties and 
duties imposed on them, but in general, due to government control, energy prices such as oil products, gas 
and electricity in China are lower than the international market prices. Provided oil prices in HK are a 
baseline, during 2000-2006 the price of super gasoline in HK rose from $1.46 / liter to $ 1.69 / liter, 
whereas in China mainland its price was much lower, only with a rise from $ 0.4 / liter to $ 0.69 / liter. 
Likewise, diesel price gap in 2006 reached $ 0.28 / liter between China mainland and HK (see Table 6). In 
terms of electricity, according to Wang et al, the residential selling price in China hit $ 0.062 kW / h, 
which was 43.06 percent of the average of OECD countries as a whole, 58.49 percent of the US, 35.23 
percent of Japan and 23.57 percent of Germany. China's rate for industrial electricity was only $ 0. 68Kw 
/ h, which was 72.34 percent of the average of OECD countries, 58.62 percent of Japan, and 62.39 percent 
of Germany.xxxix
Pricing for crude oil 
and coal in China basically follows in line with the international market prices whereas pricing for oil 
products, natural gas and electricity is still in the hands of the government. This is set to create 
discontinuity between the market-based pricing and the regulated pricing and affect incentives for energy 
enterprises. Even for those market-based energy types, the government may intervene in their pricing at 
any time whenever it feels the need. For example, the government announced a capon coal prices at the 
end of June 2010 for fear of rising inflation. 
 
Table 6 International Comparison of Oil Prices (USD cent / liter)  
Source: International Road Federation, World Road Statistics 2008.  
266   Chen Shaofeng /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  253 – 270 
Lower energy prices are bound to leading to low energy use efficiency and high emission of pollutants. 
As shown in Figure 6, notwithstanding a big jump during 1980-2007, China's energy intensity, calculated 
as units of energy per unit of GDP, is still much higher than developed countries and even India. By the 
same token, by 2006, China's CO2 emission intensity, calculated as units of CO2 emission per unit of GDP, 
reached 22.9 KT CO2 Emission / 10000 GDP, much higher than 3KT of Japan and 4.4KT of US.xl Despite 
low energy efficiency, operation of domestic gigantic manufacturing industry still calls for a bulk of 
energy resources. Hence, in China's energy consumption structure, manufacturing and mining industries 
account for about 70 percent of China's energy use and services and agricultural industries only has a 
share of 30 percent, whereas manufacturing industry only contributes 43 percent to China's GDP. As a 
result, energy consumption for every unit of GDP in manufacturing industry is 63 percent higher than that 
in other industries.xli
Figure 6 Energy Intensity (Unit: kg oil equivelent/100 GDP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
When discussing China's domestic consumption, however, we should not ignore the bulky inputs of 
resources that China has placed in. These resources are consumed in China, but they are not reasonably 
priced. While helping accumulate foreign reserves, China's huge exports embodying low-price energy and 
other resources are equivalent to using its own energy and other resources to subsidize other countries, 
particularly the US and EU. China's subsidies to the outside world, tremendous as it is, have not been 
encompassed into China's domestic consumption. Without taking consideration of the environmental costs, 
roughly estimated:  
China's subsidies to the outside world = domestic energy consumed for China's exports h price gap 
between China's domestic energy and energy from international market  
Meanwhile, it should be noted that China's trade surplus has been dominated by processing trade. 
Those assembling and processing business are primarily carried out by foreign enterprises. For instance, 
exports by foreign investment enterprises in 2005 accounted for 58 percent in China's total exports; with a 
share of 55 percent, trade surplus through processing trade reached 142.5 billion dollars.
xliii
xlii According to 
the smile curve hypothesis,  positioned at the low end of value chain, manufacturing and assembly can 
only gain a 5 percent profit in average. By contrast, the multinationals can reap huge profits by marketing 
those goods assembled in China to the outside market, while consumers in foreign countries have enjoyed 
high-quality and inexpensive commodities. Thereby, it can be said that Chinese price has subsidized the 
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world, improved the life quality of foreign civilians in the US, Japan and others, and has ameliorated their 
inflation pressures. 
 
5. A Domestic Demand-Driven China : A Boon or a Bane to the World? 
The US represents a development model where domestic consumption characterized by over-
consumption or overspending by borrowing has buttressed a gigantic empire. Should China follow suit? 
Americans can borrow money from the outside world to sustain their accustomed life style, or more 
precisely, it is foreign governments that are active to lend money to the Americans by using their 
accumulated huge foreign reserves to purchase American bonds and securities with low rate of return. The 
US can enjoy such a privileged status largely because of its huge economy and the US dollar standard, in 
which the dollar is in a central position in serving as a medium of exchange and a store of value. 
Apparently, China owns no such imperative components commensurate those of the US.  
Moreover, theses on expanding a country's domestic consumption de facto centers on a goal of 
economic growth, a reflection of an entrenched ideology that GDP matters and hence should be enhanced 
at any cost. Such a thinking, however, is more detrimental to China's sustainable development since it 
only cares about the interests of some people, showing little respect to the nature. On nature, the current 
developed-West standard of living is unconscionably decadent and wasteful. If other countries such as 
China, India and Brazil also embrace such competing aspirations, it is bound to rapidly degrading the 
natural world on which we all depend, that civilization will have to retrench cataclysmically before it can 
be redirected toward sustainability. 
As shown in Table 7, with only 5 percent of world population, energy consumption in the US accounts 
for 21 percent of world total energy consumption. In contrast, China's share in world energy consumption 
is 15.8 percent with 20 percent of world population. As a result, energy consumption per capita in the 
US is 5.85 times that in China. In case every Chinese had a similar voracious appetite for energy as the 
Americans, that would call for 8.86 TOE energy, while in 2006 energy production in the whole world was 
merely 10.2 TOE, which means that China would require 86.5 percent of energy provision while other 
countries in the world could only use the other 13.5 percent of energy. Apparently this would be a 
nightmare for the international community. 
More than that, as aforementioned, because China's energy intensity is still much higher, it would mean 
a far less output with much more energy uses. Likewise, China is plagued by carbon dioxide emission and 
other severe environmental pollutions. With a much higher CO2 emission intensity, more energy use 
would only result in more pollution as well, which would be an unbearable load for the ecology. In fact, 
China's demand resulted from an enlarging domestic consumption goal would not be confined to energy; 
iron ore, aluminum, gold, uranium, and so on would be in urgent need.  
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Table 7: World Energy Balance in 2006 ˄Unit: 10,000 Tonne of Oil Equivalent (TOE) ˅ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations Energy Statistics Yearbook 2006.          
Of course, the above supposed scenario analysis preconditions that no great transformation in terms of 
China's economic structure, income distribution, technology as well as energy efficiency would take place. 
This, of course can hardly stand true considering that China is making every effort to adjust its economic 
structure, upgrade technical know-how, and improve energy efficiency. To some extent, these efforts 
could alleviate China's demand for resources, but it would not stall its growing demand momentum should 
China continue following the route that the US has trodden.  
In effect, while most new rich in China are living in the lap of luxury, a greater number of Chinese are 
longing for an “American dream”, in which an individual tries to cater to his material requisites such as 
living in spacious apartments, driving luxurious cars, and so on. If those affluent Chinese or those on the 
way to great fortunes do not relinquish their boundless pursuit for material wealth, it will exacerbate 
China's relations with other countries in the world (first and foremost the US) and will complicate 
domestic social relations as well. If it can be said that the Soviet Union was stricken down in the process 
of arms race with US, it is likely that the Chinese society and ecology will be severely hit amidst its 
economic contest with the US. Hence, China must seek its own mode of life different from the western 
society.xliv
6. Conclusion  
  
This paper attempts to analyze why China's domestic consumption has been underestimated. It is 
unreliable to conclude that China's domestic consumption is insufficient based on statistical data collected 
with a flawed method. In particular, it is liable to underreport Chinese consumption of services under the 
current statistical system. With the more frequent exchanges among people, an increasing number of 
Chinese have ample opportunities to spend abroad, resulting in some missing pies which should have been 
counted as Chinese citizens’ consumption. Among the missing pies are expenses in foreign countries by 
Chinese students studying abroad, wealthy migrants out of China, traveling and purchasing abroad by 
Chinese citizens, and so on. An underdeveloped taxation system, along with the massive size of the 
country, has also left rooms for the boom of an underground economy in China, part of which has been 
generated in the economic chain of consumptions. 
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Moreover, as a world factory, China has exported a bulk of tradable goods to the outside world. Most 
of these commodities, though not directly consumed by the Chinese citizens, have embodied under-priced 
energy and other resources. This amounts to using taxes paid by Chinese citizens to subsidize foreign 
consumers’ consumption. In other words, the losses resulting from such a price gap should have been 
counted into China's domestic consumption. In the meanwhile, it should be noted that a large portion of 
government consumption is de facto a result of private consumption because of a spate of power abuses 
by government officials and their relatives.  
Perhaps some people would argue that other countries have similar economic activities, such as foreign 
students studying in China, foreign citizens moving to China as well, but the key is that the scale of such 
overseas consumptions by Chinese citizens are much larger than their counterparts. Hence, China's 
insufficient consumption has been exaggerated, so has the role of China in aggravating global economic 
imbalance. Moreover, it is of conviction that untempered expansion of China's domestic consumption 
comparable with the US would not necessarily bode well for China and the world. Growing appetite for 
energy and other resources will not only exert formidable pressure on the international market, but also 
poses an unbearable load on the nature. Expanding domestic consumption may temporarily be able to 
sustain a high growth rate, but more important is to transform the undergoing mode of production and 
consumption. Thereby, a sustained development calls for a more balanced relationship among human 
beings, natural resources and the ecology. Future research may focus on estimating the scale of the “lost 
China's consumption”.  
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